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I. INTRODUCTION

The primary responsibility of the U.N. Security Council, as stipulated
in Article 24 of the U.N. Charter, is to ensure international peace and
security. It does so, inter alia, by determining whether there exists any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and by
deciding how to respond to such situations. Article 2 (2) of the U.N.
Charter requires all member states, "in order to ensure to all of them the
rights and benefits resulting from membership, [to] fulfill in goodfaith the
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."'
The obligation of good faith is a general principle of international law.'
According to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna Convention), "[e]very treaty in force.., must be performed by
[its parties] in good faith."3 The U.N. Charter is a treaty. Its members must
therefore fulfill their treaty obligations in good faith, including when
acting within organs established by that treaty.
The principle of good faith has a long history, and is related to the
theory of abuse of rights (abus de droit). Cheng discusses in detail the
nature of the theory of abuse of rights (breach of good faith) under the
headings (A) The Malicious Exercise of a Right, (B) The Fictitious
Exercise of a Right, (C) Interdependence of Rights and Obligation, and
(D) Abuse of Discretion.4 A related area of municipal law is that of the
abuse of discretionary rights, applicable mostly to executive,
administrative, and judicial bodies.
A public authority that repeatedly fails to act in good faith undermines
its own legitimacy.' David D. Caron writes: "Broadly speaking, a

I. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2 (emphasis added).
2. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1990).
3. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
4. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS

121-36 (1953).

5. See generally T.D. Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power ofthe UN.
Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 1995
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 127-34.
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perception of illegitimacy might be said to affect the effectiveness of an
institution in two ways. First, it might undercut the perceived legitimacy
of the rules that emanate from the institution. Second, it might threaten the
future effectiveness of the institution."' It is a known fact that political
bodies, such as governments, are prone to abuse their discretionary
powers. Government abuse can be contained through periodic elections
and through constitutional courts or appeals mechanisms. No such
mechanism exists with regard to the Council and its decisions. In Derek
Bowett' s words: "[T]he apparent expectation that the Council will function
under the Rule of Law is not reinforced by the normal legal safeguards one
would expect to find surrounding the exercise of executive powers in a
democratic, constitutional system.... Even more disturbing, the Council
frequently fails to indicate the constitutional basis - i.e., the Charter
provision - on which it acts." 7 This circumstance alone provides a
compelling reason for subjecting the Council to the test of good faith.
Caron reviews various issues regarding allegations of illegitimate Council
decisions, including "circumstances that underpin two broad perceptions
of illegitimacy regarding the collective authority of the Security Council." 8
He refers to the perception of dominance of the Council by a few states
and the perception of unfairness surrounding the veto. In the present
Article, we present further grounds for questioning the legitimacy of the
Council and its decisions.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF GOOD FAITH WITH REGARD TO THE ABILITY OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO FULFIL ITS MANDATE

The breach of good faith by the Security Council or its members, by
and in itself, does not give rise to international liability, neither that of the
United Nations nor of those member states who may breach their duty of
good faith. However, subjecting the decisions of the Council to the test of
good faith may be relevant for states who are loath to pursue Council
decisions they consider as ultra vires. Should wide segments of popular
opinion around the world reach the conclusion that the Council, as
presently composed, cannot be presumed to act in good faith, this
conclusion could have significant, or even revolutionary, consequences.

6. David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 558 n.24 (1993).
7. Derek Bowett, The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement
Procedures, 5 EUR. J. INT'LL. 89 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Caron, supra note 6, at 555.
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III. How CAN THE GOOD FAITH OF THE U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL BE ASSESSED?

The Security Council possesses a wide margin of discretion to
determine when collective action for the maintenance of peace is
necessary. Using the terminology introduced by Cheng, we say that the
Council possesses certain rights, such as to characterize circumstances as
threatening international peace and security, to select measures in response
to such circumstances and to implement or order member states to
implement such measures.
There are a number of occasions in which the Security Council might
abuse such rights. First, abuse may arise when it determines the existence
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression or fails
to do so. Secondly, the selection and design of responses to the threat or
breach of the peace may'result in abuse. Thirdly, the Council may abuse
its discretion when it reviews measures it already imposed.
The Security Council would thus not be acting in good faith if it were
to fraudulently characterize a situation as a threat to international peace
and security, which by any reasonable standard does not constitute such a
threat. States wielding their veto power, or threatening to do so, would
equally breach their obligations of good faith, if by such conduct they
prevent the Council from responding effectively to serious threats to, or
breaches of, the peace. When selecting responses to threats to, or breaches
of, the peace, the Council would abuse its discretionary rights, were it to
select measures unlikely to restore the peace, or fail to end such measures
it has already adopted when it has become obvious that they are not
effective to restore the peace.
The Security Council has often been rightly criticized for pursuing
double standards. The preamble of the U.N. Charter includes, however, the
pledge of U.N. members to "reaffirm faith ... in the equal rights ... of

nations large and small." 9 Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter also places a
duty upon both the United Nations (and its organs) and its members to act
in accordance with "the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members."'" This obligation extends to all purposes of the U.N. Charter
(enumerated under Article 1), including action for the maintenance of
international peace and security." Should the Council only respond to
breaches committed by small or weak nations and fail to act when
powerful nations commit similar or even more serious breaches, it would

9. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
10. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
I1. Id. art. 1.
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not fulfil its duty to act in good faith with respect to the principle of the
sovereign equality of all U.N. members.
A. What Could Constitute a "Threat to the Peace"?
Under the provisions of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is
entitled to initiate collective enforcement measures when having
determined either one of three situations: the threat to the peace, a breach
of the peace, or an act of aggression. While the U.N. General Assembly
adopted in 1974 a definition of "aggression,"' 2 its use is not binding on the
Council. Moreover, the Council has "never made a determination that a
given situation or use of force by any State constituted an act of
aggression."' 3 The Council, in order to retain the highest degree of
discretion in responding to such acts, designates even blatant acts of
aggression as "breaches of the peace."' 4 In spite of distinguishing between
aggression and a breach of the peace in its terminology, the Council has
responded to various breaches of the peace in a similar manner as if they
were acts of aggression, particularly by designating the guilty party.' 5
Of interest here is the third elusive situation that may be invoked by the
Security Council to trigger enforcement action - threats to the peace.
There exists no definition of what this expression actually means. Most
observers, including those who have identified legal limits to U.N.
enforcement action, consider that the Council possesses unlimited
discretion to determine what constitutes a threat to the peace.' 6 Few, if any,
have questioned this unlimited discretion. 7

12. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (1974).
13. Gill, supra note 5, at 44-45. However, by SCR 573, the U.N. Security Council
condemned "the act of armed aggression perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory in flagrant
violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and norms of conduct" and
demanded "that Israel refrain from perpetrating such acts of aggression or from threatening to do
so." S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (1985) (emphasis
added). The U.N. Security Council did not, however, refer to Article 39 of the U.N. Charter in its
resolution.
14. Id. at 45. Even the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 was not
characterized as an act of aggression, but as a "breach of the peace." Id.
15. For example, in SCR 660 of August 2, 1990, the U.N. Security Council determined "that
there exists a breach of international peace and security" and identified the guilty party by
"condemn[ing I the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait." S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
16. Gill writes, for example: "The Security Council is not bound by any definition or formula
as to what constitutes a threat to or breach of the peace or act of aggression." Gill, supra note 5, at
40.
17. See D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 13 (1976).
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Indeed, a plain reading of the U.N. Charter provides few if any criteria
to be used in gauging the existence of a threat to the peace. No provisions
of the U.N. Charter place an explicit limit on what could conceivably
constitute a threat to the peace. Theoretically, any situation, circumstance,
or act, by a single person or by a whole nation, could be determined as a
threat to the peace. According to a textual reading of the U.N. Charter, the
Security Council would be entitled to do nothing even in the face of the
most blatant violation of a member state's sovereignty or of its territorial
integrity, as a threat to the peace; conversely, it would also be entitled to
designate legitimate or even trivial conduct by states or individuals as such
a threat to international peace and security.
1. The Concept of "State of Necessity" in
Justification of Countermeasures
When carrying out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, the Security Council is acting in lieu of
member states. States are entitled to use force against, or engage in
unfriendly conduct towards, other states in cases of necessity. The plea of
necessity must not be contrived. Cheng lists several rules that can be
deduced from case law .regarding the plea of necessity:
1. When the existence of a State is in peril, the necessity of selfpreservation may be a good defence for certain acts which
would otherwise be unlawful....
2. [T]he proprietary rights of others... may be disregarded in case
of an irresistible and absolute necessity.
3. This necessity must be "absolute" in that the very existence of
the State is in peril.
4. This necessity must be "irresistible" in that all legitimate means
of self-preservation have been exhausted and proved to be of no
avail.
5. This necessity must be actual and not merely apprehended."8
The judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the
Case Concerning the Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)
(1997) demonstrates how a court ascertains the legality of acts in light of

18. CHENG, supra note 4, at 7 1.
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the principle of a "state of necessity."' 9 In that case, the ICJ referred in
paragraph 50 to Article 33 of the International Law Comission Draft
Articles on State Responsibility.2" According to this Article, a state of
necessity would only preclude the wrongfulness of acts (countermeasures)
when it "was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the
State against a grave and imminent peril... ''2
The ICJ considered in paragraph 51 "that the state of necessity is a
ground recognized by customary international law for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international
obligation."2 When circumstances arise in the world that threaten gravely
and imminently the existence of the international community or the
international order, those mandated to ensure the peace would be entitled
to invoke a state of necessity.
2. Application of the Concept of "Necessity" to the
U.N. Security Council
Let us now apply the criteria of necessity to situations in which the
Security Council deems a circumstance as constituting a threat to
international peace, warranting the use of coercion or force against
individuals or states. It is obvious that the Council cannot wait for a
situation to evolve to the point that a number of individuals could put the
existence of the international community, or mankind, in peril. It is,
however, equally true that the Council - as the agent of the collective will
of U.N. members - may only act when a threat to international peace is
imminent and grave and certainly not as a response to contrived or
hypothetical threats, or to threats that are not imminent and can be dealt
with by consultation, negotiation and other peaceful recourse.
States invoking the plea of necessity for violating the rights of other
states, or imposing a state of emergency in their internal order, bear a
burden of proof to demonstrate the irresistible need for such measures.23
By analogy it is submitted that the Security Council, when invoking a
threat to the peace as the key to the imposition of forceful measures, would

19. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. REP. 7(Sept. 25), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgement/ihs-ijudgment-970925-frame.htm (last
visited Apr. 7, 2003).
20. Id. para. 50.
21. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adoptedby
International Law Commission, 53d Sess. art. 25(I)(a) (2001).
22. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 19, 51.
23. CHENG, supra note 4, at 73-74.
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equally bear the burden of proving the existence of an imminent and grave
threat that cannot be dealt with by any other means.
After the demise of the Soviet bloc, a perceptible widening could be
observed in the interpretation by the Western-dominated Security Council
of the concept of threat to the peace. Whereas formerly the concept was
mostly limited to blatant interstate threats, the Council widened its
interpretation to selected internal conflicts and other circumstances in
which no direct threat is leveled at any particular state.
By resolution 794 (1992), the Security Council determined that the
"magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia"
constituted a threat to international peace and security. 24 Similar
25
determinations were made with regard to the internal situation in Haiti
and in Iraq.26 Such determinations were not made, however, with regard
to the genocide committed in Rwanda, to the use of force in Chechnya or
to the continued occupation by Israel of Palestinian territories and Israel's
oppressive measures, to name just three glaring examples. In the case of
Libya, the Council determined that the refusal to extradite alleged
terrorists constituted a "threat to international peace",27 while in other
cases, the Council, basing itself on Chapter VII (which implies the

24. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992); Caron, supra note

6, at 552 n.3.
25. SCR 841 refers to "these unique and exceptional circumstances, the continuation [of
which] threatens international peace and security in the region." S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993). The circumstances referred to in the resolution
are mainly domestic in nature although in order to bring the resolution into conformity with the
mandate of the U.N. Security Council to respond to "international" threats, it refers to the flow of
refugees from Haiti as causing "negative repercussions in the region." Id.
26. In SCR 688 the U.N. Security Council condemned "the repression of the Iraqi civilian
population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the
consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region." S.C. Res. 688, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess, 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991). This resolution, however, does not
refer to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
27. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., pmbl. 1 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748
(1992).
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existence of a threat or breach of the peace), established international ad
hoc criminal tribunals28 and the U.N. Compensation Commission29 as a
response to such threat or breach which was not identified.
The expression "threat to the peace" is thus increasingly losing its
original meaning and becoming a mere password permitting the invocation
of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the legal garb for forceful intervention
under the authority of the Security Council. Opinions differ whether
widening the scope of Council activism is advisable or not. Without
entering this debate, we venture that the international community has not
delegated to the Council the prerogatives of a global government or that
of a court ofjustice. It remains a political forum where the most powerful
states negotiate their global interests.
The following example suggests that norms, such as the principle of
good faith, are needed in order to objectively assess the performance of the
Security Council. After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in
New York on September 11, 2001, Western media started to speculate on
the role that Islamic schools might have played in the indoctrination of
suicide bombers. According to a broad interpretation of the expression
threat to the peace, the Council would be entitled to monitor Islamic
education worldwide, on the presumption that such education could
threaten international peace.30 The same reasoning could be extended in
support of an international body that would monitor the teaching of
physics and chemistry, anywhere, because such education could provide
young people with the skills needed to build weapons of mass destruction

28. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established under the
terms of SCR 808 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established under the
terms of SCR 955. See generally S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808 (1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994).
29. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981 st mtg., 118, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
The resolution does not identify, except in deliberately vague terms, what conduct by Iraq
constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The establishment by the U.N. Security
Council of a quasi-judicial body, such as the Compensation Commission, has been criticized by a
number of legal scholars as ultra vires the U.N. Charter, a matter outside the scope of this Article.
30. Such hypothesis is not entirely fortuitous. Presumably as a consequence of U.S. pressure,
the government of Yemen has closed Islamic educational institutions and deported hundreds of
foreign students. See YEMEN TIMEs, Nov. 12, 2001, available at http://www.yementimes.com/Ol/
iss46/ln.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2003); see also Dmitri Litvinovich, America Divides Arab
Countries Into "Bad" and "Very Bad," PRAVDA, Nov. 28, 2001, available at http://english.
pravda.ru/war/2001/1 1/28/No#22264.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
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that could "threaten the peace."'" The most varied human activities could
be used for terrorist purposes (as the use of a civil airplane as a tool for
terrorism demonstrated) and therefore would be subject to stringent
regulation and monitoring by the Council. Ultimately, the very existence
of human beings is potentially a threat to the peace, because every human
being is capable of harboring ill designs and conspire in acts threatening
international peace and security. Cameras and recorders could be installed
in selected private homes under the authority of a Council Resolution to
ascertain whether parents indoctrinate their children with ideas whose
application might threaten the peace.
The above reasoning, taken to its absurd limits, demonstrates that if the
Security Council were deemed to possess unlimited discretion in making
presumptions regarding looming threats to the peace, it could be regarded
by the peoples of the United Nations as a totalitarian body that itself
threatens international peace and security. To the extent the Council edges
towards such totalitarian practices it undermines its own legitimacy and
becomes, itself, a threat to the peace.
Accordingly, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Security
Council's powers to characterize a situation as a threat to the peace must
be assessed in the light of the principle of good faith. Good faith in this
context requires that the Council act responsibly, effectively, objectively,
fairly and with a sense of proportion.32 To act responsiblywould mean to
place international peace and security at the center of its concerns, and not
its permanent members' particular interests. To act effectively requires that
the Council achieve its aims with the least human and material costs and
refrain from adopting measures unlikely to restore the peace.33 To act

31. Such reasoning may have prompted the effective ban on items for teaching physics and
chemistry imposed on Iraq since August 1990 and the cultural and intellectual isolation of Iraq. See
The Effect of the Embargo on the Educational System in the Governorates of Iraq Excluding SelfRuled Govemorates, availableat http://www.pitt.edu/-mmcclure/Iraq/IraqiMOE.htm (last visited
May 9, 2003); see also LEILA RICHARDS ET AL., LIVING UNDER THE SANCTIONS IN IRAQ: THE OILFOR-FOOD PROGRAM AND THE INTELLECTUAL EMBARGO (Leila Richards ed., 1999).

32. CHENG, supra note 4, at 133-34 (discussing the "abuse of discretion," suggests that an
exercise of good faith by an actor possessing discretionary power means that it must act
"reasonably, honestly, in conformity with the spirit of the law and with due regard to the interests
of others.").
33. The first listed purpose of the U.N. Charter is to "maintain international peace and
security, and to that end... take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace. . ." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. I (emphasis added). The obligation of
effectiveness is double: firstly, to effectively remove genuine threats to the peace; and secondly,
to end measures previously adopted that turn out to be ineffective to remove such threats (or not
adopt such measures in the first place).
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objectively would mean that its assessments must be based on verifiable
facts, conduct or threats, rather than on speculation. To act fairly would
mean to respond in a similar manner to similar threats and avoid double
standards. To act with a sense of proportionwould be to adjust responses
to the immediacy and severity of the threat to the peace that has been
determined.34
In his textbook InternationalLaw, D.W. Greig provides some evidence
on state practice relative to the cases when Security Council enforcement
measures are warranted:
In its discussions of the Palestine question in 1948, the Security
Council was faced with what action to take on a proposed partition
plan. Even if a solution imposed by the Council might in general
terms help the restoration of international peace and security, the
majority of U.N. members would have agreed with the view of the
U.S. representative that Articles 41 and 42 only enabled the Council
to take action directly relatedto, and not simply with the ultimate
object of, restoring international peace security.
Greig also concurs with the view of the United States and the United
Kingdom that decisions of the Security Council "take on a binding quality
only as they relate to the prevention or suppression of breaches of the
peace," and that decisions referred to in Article 25 are limited by the words
"in accordance with the provision of the Charter." 36 He adds:
The restrictive view of Article 41 is reinforced by a further
reference to Article 39. Under Article 39, once the Security Council
has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression, it can, inter alia, decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 to maintain or restore
international peace and security. In other words, the threat to the
peace under the first part of Article 39 must, in order to justify
action under Article 41, be of such a degree as to place the

34. The principle of proportionality here is limited to jus ad bellum, to be distinguished from
the principle by the same name used injus in bello. See generally Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin
Terms Jus ad BellutJus In Bello, 320 INT'LREV. RED CROSS 553(1997), available at http://www.
icrc.org/web/englsiteengO.nsf/iwpListl63ID9DAD4EE8533DAEFC1256B66005AFFEF
(last
visited Apr. 7, 2003).
35. GREIG, supra note 17, ch. 13 (emphasis added).
36. MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN,U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB.No. 8424, DIG. INT'L L. 361-62
(1968).
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continuation of peace in jeopardy, so that action is immediately
necessary in order to maintain international peace and security. The
Rhodesian situation [referred to in the same chapter] is hardly a
threat to the peace in the sense of requiring immediate remedial
action. Indeed, the Council in its second resolution [S/RES/217
(1965)] after Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence
characterised this action by the "illegal authorities" as "extremely
grave" but determined that the "continuance" of the situation would
only "in time" constitute a threat to international peace and
security.37
Does the U.N. Charter contain provisions supporting the above view
that U.N. action under Article 41 requires the threat to the peace to be of
such a degree as to place the peace in jeopardy? Is it possible to determine
a particular threshold of gravity that could guide the Security Council in
its determinations? The U.N. Charter, indeed, includes various provisions
supporting the view that the drafters intended a gradationof responses to
threats, implying varying degrees of threats to the peace. Article 1 (1) of
the U.N. Charter, distinguishes between two approaches by the United
Nations to "maintain international peace and security."3 One approach is
to "bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles
ofjustice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."39 The
other approach is "to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of
aggression or other breaches of the peace."4 Those effective collective
measures are listed in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and include both
non-military measures (exemplified under Article 41) and military
measures (exemplified under Article 42).41 We have here already three
gradations: Peaceful measures, non-military collective enforcement
measures, and military collective enforcement measures. Within each of
these categories, further gradations are possible and could be observed in

37. GREIG, supra note 17, at 747 (emphasis added).
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.

39. Id.(emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Id. arts. 41-42.
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the practice of the Council. The principle of graded responses can also be
inferred from the language of Article 4042 and Article 42.
B. Good Faithand the Choice of Responses to a "Threat to the Peace"
The principle of good faith is also applicable to responses adopted by
the Security Council to threats to, or breaches of, the peace. Assuming the
existence of such a threat or breach requiring an international response, the
Council has to act in good faith in selecting an adequate response to such
a threat or breach. The obligation of good faith would be breached were
Council members to select responses to a threat to, or breach of, the peace,
in order to promote their own interests rather than the removal of the threat
or breach. Good faith would also be breached if forceful responses were
44
imposed in cases that do not represent an imminent "threat to the peace"
or in cases when attempts to "bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles ofjustice and international law, adjustment
or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace" have not been exhausted. 5
The adequacy of a proposed measure to remove the threat or breach
provides clues regarding the good faith of the Security Council and its
members. Unless the proposed measure(s) can reasonably be expected at
the outset to remove the threat to, or breach of, the peace, it cannot be
deemed to have been imposed in good faith. The concept of adequacy
encompasses both the principles of necessity and proportionality; in other
words there must be a compelling necessity to select and impose particular

42. "In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before
making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon
the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable."
Id. art. 40.
43.
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
44. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated that"preventive action in foreign
territory" would be permissible only when justified in case of "an instant and overwhelming
necessity for self-defence, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." CHENG,
supra note 4, at 84.
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 1,para. 1.
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measures and the measures must be commensurate or proportional to the
alleged threat or breach.
Under the provisions of Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, the Security
Council is expected to determine whether the measures provided for in
Article 41 would not suffice to restore the peace, before taking further
action, permitted under Article 42.46 The principle of a graded response by
the United Nations to situations that may or do threaten or breach the
peace is well entrenched within the U.N. Charter itself. A logical inference
is that the Council should, in good faith, adjust a response to the overall
nature of a threat to the peace, including its immediacy and scope,
respecting the principle of proportionality.
C. Ending PreviouslyImposed Coercive Measures and Good Faith
After the Security Council has adopted measures to address a threat to,
or breach of, the peace, it must at some point formally determine whether
such threat or breach has ended. Such a formal determination is necessary
in order to remove the binding effect of its previous decisions imposing
such measures. Should the measures adopted previously by the Council
prove ineffective to end the threat or breach and unlikely to do so in the
foreseeable future, the Council would act in bad faith, were it to maintain
these measures.
IV. EVIDENCE OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL BREACHES OF GOOD FAITH
IN DETERMINING (OR FAILING TO DETERMINE)

THREATS TO THE PEACE

The following examples illustrate various circumstances in which the
Security Council has arguably breached obligations of good faith, either
by abusively characterizing a situation as a threat to the peace or by failing
to do so when a situation obviously required international action.
Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, a de facto state of
war has existed between that state and most of its neighbors.47 Its
occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories in the 1967 war has
been regularly and overwhelmingly condemned by the U.N. General
46. Id art. 42.
47. Israel has signed peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and established some relations
with other members of the Arab League. But popular opinion in these countries, as well as in all
member states of the Arab League, appears overwhelmingly opposed to normalization with Israel.
For all practical purposes, peace between the state of Israel and Arab countries remains elusive.
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Assembly and resisted by the inhabitants of the occupied territories. At
various times in its short history, the state of Israel resorted to
invasions and attacks on Egypt (195648 and 196749), Jordan (196750 and
twice in 196851), Iraq (1981),52 Syria (1956" and 1967"4), Lebanon
(1968," 1969,56 1970, 7 1972,58 1973,' 9 1982, 60 199361), and Tunisia
48. See generally KENNET 1. LOvE, SuEz: THE TWICE-FOUGHT WAR (1969); ANTHONY
NUTTING, No END OF A LESSON: THE STORY OF SUEZ (1967). The U.N. Security Council, due to

the veto of two permanent members (the United Kingdom and France) could not adopt a resolution
condemning this act of aggression. See also S.C. Res. 119, U.N. SCOR, IIth Sess., 75 1st mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 19 (1956).
49. See S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (1967); see
also RANDOLPH & WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE SIX-DAY WAR (1967); HENRY CATTAN, THE
PALESTINE QUESTION 111-14 (1988).
50. See generally RANDOLPH & WINSTON CHURCHILL, supra note 49.
51. Condemned by SCR 248 (1968) and SCR 256 (1968) as constituting "flagrant" violations
by Israel of the U.N. Charter. S.C. Res. 248, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1407th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/248 (1968); S.C. Res. 256, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1440th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/256
(1968).
52. Israel attacked Iraqi non-military nuclear installations in 1981. This attack was
condemned by the U.N. Security Council. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981); see also G.A. Res. 36/27, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., 56th mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/36/27 (1981); G.A. Res. 39/14, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 65th mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/39/14 (1984); G.A. Res. 40/6, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 59th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/6
(1985) (noting Israel's refusal to comply with the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council); see
also G.A. Res. 36/98, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/98 (1981) ("[rjecalling
GC(XXV)/RES/381 adopted on.26 September 1981 by the General Conference ofthe [International
Atomic Energy] Agency," which considered the attack on Iraq as "an attack against the Agency and
its safeguards regime.").
53. Condemned by SCR I I Ias a "a flagrant violation... of Israel's obligations under the
Charter of the United Nations." S.C. Res. I 1,U.N. SCOR, 1ith Sess., 715th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/I ll (1956).
54. See supra note 49.
55. Condemned by SCR 262 as a "premeditated military action in violation of [Israel's]
obligations under the Charter." S.C. Res. 262, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1462d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/262 (1968).
56. Condemned by SCR 270 as a "premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in southern
Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the Charter and Security Council resolutions." S.C.
Res. 270, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., 1504th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/270 (1969).
57. Condemned by SCR 280 as a "premeditated military action [by Israel] in violation of its
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations." S.C. Res. 280, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1542d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/280 (1970).
58. The U.N. Security Council under SCR 316 condemned the "repeated attacks of Israeli
forces on Lebanese territory and population in violation of the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and Israel's obligations thereunder." S.C Res. 316, U.N. SCOR, 27th Sess., 1650th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/316 (1972).
59. The U.N. Security Council under SCR 332 condemned. again "the repeated military
attacks conducted by Israel against Lebanon and Israel's violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity
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and 198863). Judging by the concern expressed by U.N.
members and the extent of the efforts by the United Nations to deal
with the conflict, there is hardly any doubt that the conflict has and
continues to threaten international peace and security.' In spite of this
persistent threat, the possession by Israel of weapons of mass
destruction, and repeated and blatant breaches of the peace committed
(198562

and sovereignty in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations." S.C. Res. 332, U.N. SCOR,
28th Sess., 1711 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/332 (1973).
60. See generally Noam Chomsky, Middle East Terrorism and the American Ideological
System, in BLAMING THE VICTIMS: SPURIOUS SCHOLARSHIP AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION 97

(Edward Said & Christopher Hitchens eds., 1988).
61. The Sunday Times reported: "Late yesterday, [Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin] called off
his personal seven-day war in southern Lebanon... Rabin's War [called] Operation Accountability
has killed at least 130 and sent hundreds of thousands of Lebanese fleeing towards Beirut....
Southern Lebanon had become a land without people.... About 80 villages have been hit." Marie
Colvin et al., Rabin's War, SUNDAY TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993; see Noam Chomsky, "Limited War" in
Lebanon,ZMAGAZINE, Sept. 1993, availableat http:l/www.zmag.orglchomsky/articlesz9309-warlebanon.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
62. Condemned "vigorously" by SCR 573 as an "act of armed aggression perpetrated by
Israel against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations,
international law and norms of conduct." S.C. Res. 573, supra note 13 (emphasis omitted).
[Shimon] Peres arrived in Washington to discourse on peace and terrorism with
his partner in crime directly after having sent his bombers to attack Tunis, where
they killed twenty Tunisians and fifty-five Palestinians, Israeli journalist Amnon
Kapeliouk reported from the scene. That target was undefended, "a vacation resort
with several dozen homes, vacation cottages and PLO offices side by side and
intermingled in such a way that even from close by it is difficult to distinguish"
among them ....
"The people who were in the bombed buildings were mangled
beyond recognition."... Tunisia had accepted the Palestinians at Reagan's behest
after they had been expelled from Beirut in a US-supported invasion [by Israel]
that left some twenty thousand killed and much of the country destroyed.
Chomsky, supra note 60, at 99. Chomsky continues: "The United States officially welcomed the
Israeli bombing of Tunis as 'legitimate response' to 'terrorist attacks' ... The US drew back from
such open support after an adverse global reaction, but it abstained from U.N. condemnation of this
act... .- alone as usual." Id. at 101.
63. Condemned "vigorously" by SCR 611 as an "aggression perpetrated on 16 April 1988
against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Tunisia in flagrant violation of the Charter of the
United Nations, international law and norms of conduct." S.C. Res. 611, U.N. SCOR, 43d Sess.,
2810th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/611 (1988).
64. In the debate preceding the vote on a draft resolution placed on the U.N. Security Council
on December 14,2001, a number ofrepresentatives (China, Singapore, Columbia, and Bangladesh)
referred to the conflict in the Middle East as endangering or threatening "international peace and
security." Draft Resolution of Dec. 14, 2001, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1199 (2001)
[hereinafter December Draft].
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by the state of Israel, the Security Council has never determined that
the situation in Israel-Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace, which
could pave the way for U.N. enforcement measures for the removal of
that threat. Since 1967 alone, the United States vetoed over 40 attempts
by the Council to address this situation.65 Even modest attempts to
reduce the level of violence in the area, such as through an
international monitoring mechanism, have been vetoed by the United
States. 66
On December 20, 1989, twenty-four thousand U.S. troops invaded
Panama in a military mission, code-named "Operation Just Cause."
The declared purposes of the invasion were to "(A) Protect U.S. lives
and key sites and facilities [in Panama]. (B) Capture and deliver
[Panamian President] Noriega to competent authority [in the United
States]. (C) Neutralize PDF [(Panamian Defense Forces)] forces.
(D) Neutralize PDF command and control. (E) Support establishment
of a U.S.-recognized government in Panama. (F) Restructure the
PDF. ' ' 67 In spite of the U.S. invasion of Panama being a blatant
violation of international law 68 and of the U.N. Charter, a draft
resolution in the Security Council condemning the invasion was
defeated on 23 December by the veto of the P-3 (France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States). By their veto, cast in bad faith, the
P-3 prevented the Council from censuring the United States for
violating the U.N. Charter, breaching the peace and stating the
responsibility of the aggressor under international law for the
consequences of that breach.
In 1992 the Security Council decided to impose sanctions on Libya for
the "failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete
actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular its continued
failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests of resolution 731

65.

PHYuis BENNIS, CAuJNGTHE SHOTS: How WASHINGTON DOMINATES TODAY'S UN 27

(1996).
66. See, e.g., December Draft, supra note 64. The draft resolution was defeated by the veto
of the United States against 12 affirmative votes and two abstentions (the United Kingdom and
Norway).
67. Military Analysis Network, Operation Just Cause, at http://www.fas.org/man/dod101/ops/just.cause.htm; see also U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, Speech Regarding the
Invasion of Panama (Dec. 20, 1989), available at http://www.historychannel.comspeeches/
archive/speech-l 3.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2003) (justifying the invasion of Panama).
68. See Military Analysis Network, supra note 67; see also Hal Hinson, The Panama
Deception, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1992, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
style/longterm/movies/videos/thepanamadeceptionnrhinson.a0a7bd.htm (last visited Apr. 7,2003).
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(1992)."69 The request referred to the demand made by the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France for Libya to extradite to the
named countries Libyan nationals allegedly responsible for the
destruction of Pan-Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772, resulting in the
deaths of hundreds of passengers and crew.7" No evidence was
presented to the Council that the Libyan Government or Libyan
nationals were responsible for these crimes.7 The alleged failure by the
Libyan Government to cooperate with the Council - or with the
governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
which alleged Libya's responsibility - was characterized as a "threat
to international peace and security."72 While international terrorism is
generally considered a scourge, there actually exists no recognized
definition of this term under international law. None of the other cases
of destroying civilian airplanes in midair were submitted to the Council
and characterized as international terrorism, let alone a "threat to
international peace and security."73 In the case of Libya, a threat to
international peace and security was based on a presumption of guilt,
a selective application of the term "international terrorism"7 4 and on the
claim that the mere lack of cooperation by the government of Libya on
the question of criminal extradition constituted a threat to international
peace and security, warranting forceful measures.
When SCR 687 regarding the continued maintenance of economic
sanctions against Iraq was.debated, Cuba introduced an amendment
that would have placed demands for Iraqi elimination of weapons of
mass destruction in the context of being "a first step towards the full
elimination of weapons of mass destruction and weapon systems
incompatible with the aim of achieving a comprehensive, just, and

69. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 27.
70. See S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/73l (1992).
71. The only reference to any factual evidence were undisclosed "investigations" by the
governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. pmbl. 16.
72. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 27, pmbl. 16.
73. See Who Remembers LAA Flight 114?, available at http://www.washington-report.
org/backissues/091983/830919003.html (last visited Apr. 7,2003); see KAL007 and Iran Air 655:
Comparing the Coverage, at http://www.fair.org/extra/best-of-extra/kaO07-iranair655.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2003); see George C. Wilson, Navy Missile Downs Iranian Jetliner, WASH. POST,
July 4, 1988, at A01; CIA Helps Peruvian Jet Shoot Down Christian Missionaries over Amazon,
at http://www.november.org/razorwirelmay-june200l/24002.html (last visited May 9, 2003).
74. The shooting down of civilian airplanes by Israel (1983), the Soviet Union (1983), and
the United States at different times, was never alluded to by the U.N. Security Council as acts of
international terrorism nor as a "threat to international peace and security."
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lasting peace in the Middle East."75 The United States secured the
defeat of this amendment, leaving unaddressed - even at the hortatory
level - the question of Israel's weapons of mass destruction that is
directly related to the militarization of Middle Eastern states, including
Iraq. 6 It must be remembered that Israel persistently, and without
incurring any sanction, disregards SCR 487 (1981) which called on
Israel to "urgently... place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards
of the International Atomic Energy Agency" - a call reiterated by
U.N. General Assembly resolutions - and noted that Israel "has not
adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."'"
Yet, no resolution of the Security Council has ever referred to the threat
to the peace emanating from the possession by Israel of weapons of mass
destruction,'78 nor has any effective measure been undertaken by the
Security Council to secure the quest of the international community for a
nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.'9
V. CAN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL BE GENERALLY
PRESUMED TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH?

Most scholarly writings on the prerogatives of the Security Council
proceed from the assumption that it generally acts in good faith. Such
opinion is supported by the dicta of the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion on
CertainExpenses of the United Nations (1962). In that Opinion, the ICJ
held that "when the Organization took action which warranted the
assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated
purposes of the United Nations ...the presumption is that such action is
not ultra vires the Organization." g The presumption of good faith is also
75. BENNIS, supra note 65, at 39.

76. Id.; see also Comments by Cuba's Ambassador to the United Nations During the Debate
on SCR 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc S/PV.2981 (1991).
77. See S.C. Res. 487, supra note 52; G.A. Res. 39/14, supra note 52; G.A. Res. 40/6, supra
note 52.
78. However, Resolution 46/39 of December 6, 1991 (and others adopted earlier and later)
specifically refers to the danger to "international peace and security as a result of Israel's
development and acquisition of nuclear weapons." G.A. Res. 46/39, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 65th
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46139 (1991).
79. See, e.g., id. (adopted by a vote of 76-3-75 on "Israel nuclear disarmament," with only
the United States, Israel, and Romania opposing the resolution); GA Res. 46/30, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., 65th mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/46/30 (1991) (adopted on the same day without a vote on the
"[e]stablishment of a nuclear-free zone in the region of the Middle-East.").
80. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 168 (July 20).
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regarded as a general principle of law. But is the presumption of good faith
applicable to any actor, regardless of his or her previous record?
A. Arguments for the Presumptionof Good Faith
1. A General Presumption of Innocence
The presumption of innocence is a general principle of law but not a
general prescription for human conduct. As individuals observe others'
conduct, they develop expectations regarding others' probable conduct.
When an individual or an institutional actor demonstrates a pattern of
mendacity, third parties cannot be blamed when their conduct toward that
actor reflects some distrust. Such a presumption of bad faith is also
warranted when an institutional actor engages in efforts to avoid
accountability, hide decision-making mechanisms or provide grossly
inadequate justifications for discretionary acts. To the extent that the
Council, or its dominant members, have demonstrated a pattern of
mendacity or have attempted to escape accountability for their decisions,
a presumption of bad faith would be justified.
2. States' General Acquiescence to U.N. Security Council Decisions
It is true that most Security Council decisions are adopted with a
comfortable majority and that states generally comply with binding
Council decisions.8 There are a number of reasons for the acquiescence
to the will of the Council. Initiators of draft resolutions in the Council
usually do so after having sounded out other Council members. Drafts
unlikely to pass are seldom submitted for voting in the first place.
Furthermore, affirmative votes within the Security Council are often
secured through pressures exercised outside the Council, particularly when
powerful members are determined to force the adoption of their draft
resolutions. It is therefore not always possible to gauge the degree of free
will exercised by Council members when casting their vote. In order to
evaluate the reasons for acquiescence to Council decisions, it is necessary
to take into consideration the vulnerability of each member state to

81. This statement must, however, be qualified. Formal acquiescence is often accompanied
by various degrees of covert noncompliance. Measures of covert noncompliance may range from
deliberately negligent domestic enforcement of U.N. Security Council decisions to devious attempts
to subvert the effect of U.N. Security Council decisions. The covert nature of such measures
reflects the fear ofstates to openly challenge the most powerful international actor(s). Acquiescence
in such cases is mere lip service.
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political, economic and military pressure by powerful members who are
determined to secure the adoption of a resolution.
Finally, it must be noted that a country's government does not
necessarily represent the interests of the majority of its constituents.
Depending on the perspective, what may appear as acquiescence to an
overriding international good could well be regarded as an act of
complicity with powerful states. More significant is, however, that
widespread compliance with the decisions of a public authority does not
necessarily prove the good faith of that authority. It may only reflect the
power wielded by that authority to induce compliance.
B. Arguments Against the Presumptionof Good Faith
There are two main reasons for not presuming good faith by the
Security Council. The first reason relates to systemic factors, such as its
lack of accountability, its composition and its rules of procedure. The
second reason is that its permanent members have demonstrated over a
long period a pattern of mendacity, hypocrisy and recklessness.
An institution possessing vast unaccountable powers is prone to abuse
its powers. The Security Council possesses such vast powers. It is
unaccountable in various ways to the collective membership of the United
Nations: its composition is unrepresentative of the U.N. membership;82 its
procedures are not democratic;83 its meetings are generally held behind
closed doors; and the deliberations of these closed meetings are not
generally publicized, even post facto. Its decisions are neither subject to
political review by the U.N. General Assembly nor reviewable as to their
constitutionality by the ICJ (the main judicial organ of the United
Nations). To reach its conclusions the Council is not bound to "examine
in any depth the legal considerations" of its decisions. 4 Its decisions often
diverge from those, on the same issues, adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly.85

82. Gowlland-Debbas is emphatic: "The Council is a political organ: it is composed of
governmental representatives which cannot even be said, in contrast to the General Assembly, to
represent the international community as a whole." Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council
Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 71 (1994).
83. The special rights secured by the victors of World War 11to themselves (France, the
United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China) within the U.N. Security Council
(permanent seat, veto rights) stand in glaring contradiction with the democratic principle of the
equality of nations, small and large, enshrined elsewhere in the U.N. Charter.
84. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 82, at 71.
85. Koskenniemi provides the following examples:
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Notwithstanding the claim that the Security Council acts in the name
of the international community, the Council and its dominant members
seldom consult that community of states, let alone the constituent peoples
of that community of states, supposed to be the ultimate beneficiaries of
Council action. The overwhelming majority of mankind is probably not
aware even of the existence of the Council. Even within educated elites of
those nations who dominate the Council, only few have a working
knowledge of the competence and composition of the Council, and only
a small proportion of those who possess such knowledge can actually
influence the policies their government pursues in the Council.
The Security Council's rules of procedure, its aristocratic composition
and its powers of appreciation cannot be changed without amending the
U.N. Charter. But such an amendment can be blocked by any permanent
Council member. The international community is thus constitutionally
prevented from exercising an effective control over the Council. It is
effectively held hostage by those who established their institutional
privileges after World War II, the Permanent Five. Non-accountability is
built into the U.N. Charter and taints thereby the work and decisions of the
Council.
When participating in international organizations, states act in
accordance with their perceived self-interest. They pursue within such
organizations their foreign policies and cannot be presumed to act solely
or even principally for the common good of the international community.
It may be retorted that the Security Council, indeed, reflects nothing
but the convergence of particular interests, informed by real power
relations within the international order. Based on a decentralized
international order, the Council could not be expected to reflect a common
moral purpose. What such "realist" views fail to capture is that an effective
international authority requires legitimacy. It cannot rule simply by

A non-aligned draft resolution in the Council (S/21048) would have deplored the

intervention [of the United States in Panama in December 1989] but was vetoed
on 23 December by the US, France and United Kingdom (the vote having been
10-4-1). A resolution closely following the text of the earlier non-aligned draft
was passed by the General Assembly on 29 December, UNGA Res. 44/240 (7520-40). A comparable method was used by the Assembly in 1980 to condemn the
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan - where a resolution essentially similar to that
passed in the Assembly had been subject of the Soviet veto; and the US invasion
of Grenada - where the Assembly passed a resolution essentially similar to an
earlier draft vetoed in the Council by the US.
Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the U.N. -A Dialectical View,
6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 341 n.63 (1995).
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asserting its might. The conduct of the Council does not become legitimate
or its decisions binding in law because its members declare it to be.
Legitimacy and legality can only be assessed from the outside. Any person
can observe and examine the conduct of international organizations and
organs and determine whether such conduct is lawful or not. While
determinations by private persons or legal commentators do not bind states
acting under the authorization of the Council, states acting under invalid
or bad faith resolutions of the Council can only do so by deceiving their
own constituents.
It cannot be denied that if states are willing to implement Security
Council measures, and are committed to enforce these decisions, there is
no physical force capable to prevent such action. This does not make such
action legitimate or even lawful nor prevent individuals and groups from
designating the Council as an usurper. The peoples of the United Nations,
who are the true sovereign of this organization, may at any time conclude
that the Council is not promoting but actually threatening international
peace and security and that consequently acts and policies pursued by
governments under the authority of Council resolutions must be resisted
by all available means.
C. A Patternof Mendacity, Hypocrisy, and Recklessness
1. Politically Motivated Action and Inaction
In addition to the above examples of politically motivated actions and
dereliction, the following accounts throw light on the dominating position
of the United States within the Security Council and American selfperception of its role as the world's ruler. Noam Chomsky provides an
example of how the United States overtly asserts the primacy of its
national self-interest over global collective security. According to
Chomsky the United States' position
was forthrightly articulated by Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, then U.N. Ambassador, when she informed the Security
Council during an earlier U.S. confrontation with Iraq that the U.S.
will act "multilaterally when we can and unilaterally as we must,"
because "[w]e recognize this area as vital to U.S. national interests"
and therefore accept no external constraints. Albright reiterated that
stand when U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan undertook his
February 1998 diplomatic mission [to Iraq]: "We wish him well,"
she stated, "and when he comes back we will see what he has
brought and how it fits with our national interest," which will
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
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determine how we respond. When Annan announced that an
agreement had been reached, Albright repeated the doctrine: "It is
possible that he will come with something we don't like, in which
case we will pursue our national interest." President Clinton
announced that if Iraq fails the test of conformity (as determined by
Washington), "everyone would understand that then the United
States and hopefully all of our allies would have the unilateral right
6
to respond at a time, place and manner of our own choosing...,"s
Chomsky's analysis is supported by John Bolton, U.S. Under-Secretary
of State for International Organizations, who gave an unusually frank and
chilling description of the United Nations:
There is no United Nations. There is an international community
that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world,
and that is the United States, when it suits our interest, and when we
can get others to go along ...The success of the United Nations
during the Gulf War was not because the United Nations had
suddenly become successful. It was because the United States,
through President Bush, demonstrated what international
leadership, international coalition building, international diplomacy
is really all about ...When the United States leads, the United
Nations will follow. When it suits our interest to do, we will do so.
When it does not suit our interests we will not. 7
When a state remains the "only real power left in the world," it is
obviously not interested in self-limiting its discretionary power by
international rules, custom, or precedent. A common approach by rulers
to avoid accountability is to claim that each situation they face requires a
unique approach that precludes their use of guidelines or norms or the
invocation of precedents, which are essential elements for mounting a
legal challenge to conduct. Such an approach is essentially the
institutionalization of discretionary rule.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Douglas captured well the evil
nature of discretion:

86. Noam Chomsky, US. Policy: Rogue States, ZMAGAZINE (Apr. 1988), available at
http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/articles/z9804-rogue.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
87. Under-Secretary of State for International Organizations, Speech at the Global Structures
Convocation, (Feb. 3, 1994), cited in BENNIS, supra note 65, at xv.
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Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered. At times it
has been his property that has been invaded; at times, his privacy;
at times, his liberty of movement; at times, his freedom of thought;
at times, his life. Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more
destructive of freedom than any of man's other inventions. 8
An example of an attempt to prevent Security Council decisions from
having any precedent-value is provided by the U.S. representative to the
Council in the course of adopting SCR 687 (1991):
The circumstances that are before us are unique in the history of the
United Nations, and this resolution is tailoredexclusively to these
circumstances.... Certainly, the United States does not seek, nor
will it support, a new role for the Security Council as the body that
determines international boundaries.8 9
2. Securing Votes by Bribes and Threats
Generally, little public evidence transpires about covert efforts by
powerful members of the Security Council to secure votes for draft
resolutions they propose. In two specific occasions, however, such
evidence surfaced and was widely reported. To secure the adoption of SCR
678, which gave the United States and its allies a carte blanche to use force
against Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait, the United States, according to
former U.S. Attorney-General Ramsey Clark, "engaged in open bribery,
blackmail, and coercion."' Details regarding the nature and extent of such
machinations are provided by Clark and Bennis. Apart from according
Ethiopia, Zaire and Colombia new aid packages and access to World Bank
credits, and in some cases arrangements of IMF grants or loans, the United
States thawed its relations with China (frozen after the Tiananmen Square
massacre), forgave $7 billion in Egyptian debt and secured $4 billion in
loans and extended emergency aid to the then Soviet Union (to be paid by
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates after the Soviet Union
voted for the resolution). 9' Strong pressures were leveled at Malaysia,
Cuba and Yemen. While Malaysia yielded to the pressure (and was
88. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting), cited in
155 (1992).
89. Comments by Cuba's Ambassador, supra note 76 (emphasis added). The U.S.
representative alludes to the provision of the resolution to impose a border settlement between Iraq
and Kuwait.
90. CLARK, supra note 88, at 153.
RAMSEY CLARK, THE FIRE THIS TIME: U.S. WAR CRIMES IN THE GuLF

91.

BENNIS, supra note 65, at 31-32; see also CLARK, supra note 88, at 154.
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"widely criticized by its people"), neither Cuba nor Yemen did.9 2 The
United States had no leverage on Cuba but it severely punished Yemen by
cancelling its $70 million aid package to that wretchedly poor country. 3
Indeed, within minutes of the Council vote on November 29, 1990,
"Yemen's Ambassador Abdallah Saleh al-Ashtal was informed by a U.S.
diplomat, in full earshot of the world via the U.N. broadcasting
94 system,
cast.',
ever
you
vote
'no'
expensive
most
the
be
will
'that
that
Buying votes occurred again at the occasion of passing SCR 686 for a
"temporary halt in hostilities" in the Gulf.95 Bennis describes how
Washington proceeded to secure the support of Zimbabwe and Ecuador,
two important nonaligned members of the Security Council for the U.S.
draft. 96
Bennis elaborates on other methods of pressure used by the United
States on third world countries in order to secure compliance with U.S.
desires:
According to one Non-Aligned diplomat with many years
experience at the UN, U.S. control emerges partly through what he
terms "psychological pressure on the South." Some of the pressure
emerges from U.S. control over the Bretton Woods institutions.
"Sometimes all it takes is for a poor country's ambassador to be
asked, pointedly, 'Don't you have a loan pending?' for them to get
the message." Every year, a few months before the General
Assembly convenes, he recalled, the U.S. Mission to the U.N.:
publishes a compendium of issues. It includes a clear statement of
which issues Washington considers priorities, and what the U.S.
position is on each. "So without direct pressure," he said, "the U.S.
is telling all the other countries, especially the South, how they are
expected to act."
The vulnerability of any country to that pressure, of course, stands
in direct correlation to its economic precariousness and dependency
on outside aid.97

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

supra note 88, at 154.
Id. at 155.
BENNIS, supra note 65, at 33.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.at 47.
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James Baker, who served at the time of the Gulf War as U.S. Secretary
of State, confirmed in his autobiography that the adoption of U.N. SCR
678 that paved the way for the Gulf war, was secured by bribes and
threats. In his own words: "I met personally with all my Security Council
counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and
occasionally buying votes. Such are the politics of diplomacy.""8
While previous efforts to secure votes in the Security Council have
mainly been covert, the United States appears now confident to engage in
overt bribing and coercion to secure other states' support for its longsought war on Iraq.99 Erskine Childers, who served for 22 years in
"virtually all of the organizations of the UN" in the field of economic
development, was considered an "outspoken champion of the United
Nations and its mission."" A special issue of Global Governance was
dedicated to Childers after his death in 1996. Because of his lifelong
commitment to the mission of the United Nations, Childers came to the
conclusion that the Council is "not worth trying to save if the price is the
neat trickery of breaking solidarity in the South by seducing a few of its
largest countries to join Germany and Japan in an expansion of the present
reliquary cabal of so-called permanent members."' 0 ' Alluding in this paper
to the "economic extortion against member governments such as is now
practised with total impunity by the Permanent Three [France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States]," Childers called on the U.N. General
Assembly to "close down the council simply by refusing to elect any more
nonpermanent members."'0 2 He further called for "legal specialists [to]
examine the implications for international law of such extortion being a
criminal felony in the laws of the countries that practice it at the UN."' 3
Ramsey Clark had earlier proposed to criminalize "bribery, corruption,
coercion, or violence by or against [U.N.] elected or appointed

98. JAMES BAKER, THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY 305 (1995), cited by James Paul, An
Analysis of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, 2002, at http://www.accuracy.
org/un2/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2003).
99. See generally Sarah Anderson et al., Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the
Coerced?, 2003 INST. FOR POL'Y STUD., available at http://www.ips-dc.org/COERCED.pdf(last
visited Apr. 7, 2003).

100. In Renewing the United Nations System, Childers wrote: "The only hope of effectively
dealing with the world's major problems in the interest of all humankind is through the progressive
development of a working world community," cited in Brian Urquhart, Erskine Childers, 19291996, 3 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 277-78 (1997).
101. Erskine Childers, The UnitedNations and GlobalInstitutions:Discourseand Reality, 3

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 274 (1997).
102. Id. at 275.
103. Id.
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personnel."' ' 4 Under international law, coercing or corrupting state
representatives may render the conclusion of a treaty (and other binding
international decisions) void 0 5 while subtler forms of pressure are not yet
deemed violations of international norms. 10
3. Undermining the Principles and Purposes of the United Nations
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (the
Permanent Five, or P-5), possess two crucial assets as members of the
Security Council: a permanent seat and the right of veto, which ensures
their immunity against U.N. coercive action. Such aristocratic privileges
are commonly seen as a price the international community conceded to
these states for their undertaking - under the provisions of the U.N.
Charter'- to act in good faith for the maintenance of international peace
and security. Can the P-5 be trusted for this task? The following summary
of acts and policies by the P-5 might suggest an ansver.
While the primary responsibility of the U.N. Security Council is to
ensure international peace and security, the governments of the P-5
who dominate the U.N. Security Council are actually the world's main
weapons exporters0 7 while their leaders act sometimes even as
weapons super-salesmen. 0 8 The P-5 are thus the main disseminators of

104. CLARK, supra note 88, at 239. Clark writes: "The United Nations shall create an
International Court of Criminal Justice with jurisdiction to hear and decide on all formal charges
of... crimes against the U.N., including bribery, corruption, coercion, or violence by or against
its elected or appointed personnel." Id. Such ideas are based on and extend the scope of Articles
50 and 51 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which address the effect of
"corruption" or "coercion" of a "representative of a state" on the validity of Treaties. Vienna
Convention, supra note 3, arts. 50-51.
105. Vienna Convention, supra note 3, arts. 50-51.
106. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. REP. 3 (Judgment on
Jurisdiction of the Court, Feb. 2) (dissenting opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo). He mentions various
forms of pressure, deemed lawful, such as "Notes" delivered by powerful to less powerful nations.
Id. at 47. In fact, the mere existence of gross disparity in the balance of forces between states and
in their respective negotiating leverage, often suffices to induce weaker states to bow to the wishes
of the stronger ones, particularly in matters that do not directly affect their own interests.
107. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the combined arms
exports of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) between 1995 and 1999, amounted to $88 billion or 80% of
world arms exports. The United Kingdom and the United States alone supplied more than 50% of
world arms exports. Comparing National Export Control Systems, at http://projects.sipri.se/
expcon/dbl .htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2003) (Table 7A.2 includes major arms suppliers).
108. Thus, for example, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is reported to have
shown "extraordinary" interest in British arms exports, ostensibly "battling for Britain" but possibly
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tools of war among U.N. members. Such activity is hardly
commensurable with their specific mandate under the U.N. Charter nor
with the purposes of the U.N. Organization to work for international
peace.
• Each of the P-5 is a nuclear power. The ICJ determined that nuclear
weapons could hardly be used lawfully.109 As the possession, let alone
deployment, of nuclear weapons is a latent threat to the peace, it
follows that developing, stocking and deploying, nuclear weapons by
any nation represents a threat to the peace. The International Court has
moreover declared that the P-5 have not fulfilled their obligations to
negotiate, in good faith, the elimination of nuclear arms.
• Each of the P-5 has committed at various times serious breaches of the
U.N. Charter and of international law. Among such reported breaches
figure acts of aggression, I1 ° military occupation,'" international

in relation with her son's direct involvement in arms' trade and personal enrichment. JOHN PILGER,
HIDDEN AGENDAS 132-33 (1998).
109. The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996 1.C.J.
REP. 226 (July 8). By a vote 8:7 the ICJ ruled that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law." Id. para. 105(2)(E). Three of the Judges who voted
against this decision did so because they opposed the qualified formulation; in their opinion the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law in all
circumstances. See Richard Falk, Nuclear Weapons, InternationalLaw and the World Court: A
HistoricEncounter,91 Am. J. INT'L L. 64, 71-72 (1997).
110. United States has reportedly used armed force without U.N. authorization against
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Cuba, Grenada, Libya, Panama, Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. In
all the above cases the United States acted in violation of the U.N. Charter. See generally WIL.uA
BLUM, KILLING HOPE: U.S. MIUTARY AND CIA INTERVENTIONS SINCE WORLD WAR 11 (1995).
Another Permanent Member of the U.N. Security Council, the now defunct Soviet Union, invaded
Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1978, and Afghanistan in 1979, and forcefully prevented the
Baltic nations for decades to enjoy the right of self-determination. France and the United Kingdom,
also permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, conspired with Israel in attacking Egypt in
1956. The United Kingdom has joined the United States in mounting military attacks against Iraq
since 1991 in violation of international law.
111. Including particularly the protracted occupation of Tibet by China. See generally
Government of Tibet in Exile, Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts, available at http://www.tibet.
com/WhitePaper/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
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terrorism,"' war crimes,"' and complicity with genocide.' 14 The U.S.
government is alleged to have attempted the assassination of foreign
leaders." 5'
The two most powerful members of the Security Council (the United
Kingdom and the United States) have for decades provided massive
military and economic support to governments known to engage in
unlawful belligerent occupation, 1 6 racial discrimination," 7 war
crimes,1 8 genocide," 9 or gross violations of human rights. 2 ' Until the
1990s such support was justified by the Cold War. Today the United
States invokes, depending on the circumstances, a war on drugs or a
war on terrorism as justifying support to states who violate
international norms.

112. A number of acts by the United States, such as the subversive efforts by the CIA against
Cuba shortly after the Cuban revolution (which included sabotage and military attacks), the mining
of Managua's harbor in 1984, and the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in Libya on April 14, 1986
(with 60-100 casualties, mostly civilians), would be considered in today's perspective as acts of
international terrorism. The United States provided also financial, military, and logistical support
and training to terrorist groups and death squads in various Latin American countries as well as in
Angola.
113. War crimes have been attributed to U.S. acts in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,
Panama, Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Iraq; to the United Kingdom in Malaysia in the 1950s and
Kenya in 1955; to France and the United Kingdom in Yugoslavia in 1999; to the former Soviet
Union in Afghanistan; and to the Russian Federation in Chechnya. See generallyBLUM, supranote
110; CLARK, supra note 88; PILGER, supra note 108.
114. Evidence has been published on alleged U.S. complicity in the genocide committed in
Indonesia in 1965 and between 1975 and 1989 in East Timor. See generally BLUM, supranote 110,
at 193-200.
115. Id. at 453-54 (providing details on 35 U.S. plots to assassinate foreign officials and
leaders).
116. Israel has since 1967 occupied unlawfully Palestinian and Syrian territories. It annexed
the entire city of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights into Israel in violation of Security Council
resolutions. The People's Republic of China has occupied Tibet since 1950. Turkey has occupied
Northern Cyprus since 1974 in violation of Security Council resolutions. Morocco has occupied
Western Sahara since 1975 in violation of Security Council resolutions.
117. For example, South Africa's policy of apartheid and Israel's regime of systematic
discrimination against non-Jews. See generally The Racist Nature of Zionism, available at
http://www.aldeilis.net/zion/rac.html (last visited May 20, 2003).
118. Among governments under whose jurisdiction war crimes were reportedly committed
while and receiving weapons from P-5 governments figure Colombia, Israel, Indonesia, Sri Lanka,
and Iraq.
119. Rwanda, Iraq, Cambodia, and Indonesia.
120. Turkey, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, Indonesia, and numerous other countries.
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VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Even if the permanent members of the Security Council had never
breached the U.N. Charter and international legal norms; even if they had
never used or possessed weapons of mass destruction; even if they had not
been major arms exporters; and even if they could be presumed to act
solely for the common good of humanity rather than to further their
national interests within the Council; prudence alone would suffice as a
compelling justification for subjecting their decisions to the test of good
faith. Such a test is warranted, if only because any human authority is
fallible and prone to abuse a position of power. The need for
accountability with regard to good faith is particularly important when the
decisions of a public authority may affect the well-being or even lives of
millions of human beings as well as the international order. Yet, the
conduct and decisions of the Council are not subject to any effective
political accountability nor to judicial review. Individuals whose human
rights have been violated by the implementation of Council decisions are
not provided with any judicial remedies. 2 ' These shortcomings were not
particularly glaring during the Cold War when the two superpowers
effectively neutralized each other within the Council. The need for Council
accountability became a serious cause of concern after the demise of the
bipolar world.
The following tentative conclusions can now be made:
The members of the Security Council are under the legal obligation to
act in good faith when carrying out their mandate. Such obligation is
enshrined in the U.N. Charter itself and is a fundamental principle of
international law. The obligation to act in good faith applies
particularly with regard to the determination of a threat to the peace,
the choice of means to respond to such a threat and the decision when
collective enforcement measures are no longer justified.
* The permanent members of the Security Council have repeatedly
breached their obligation to fulfill their U.N. Charter obligations in
good faith when acting within and outside the Council and continue to
do so; the permanent members have at various times breached
international peace, violated the U.N. Charter and permitted or even
ordered their nationals to commit international terrorism, war crimes

121. One attempt to address the lack of judicial remedies for victims of U.N.-imposed
economic sanctions is pursued by the International Trust Fund PRICE of which the present author
is director. See International Trust Fund for Promoting Remedies for Injuries Caused by Economic
Coercion (PRICE), availableat http://www.aldeilis.net/price.html (last visited May 20, 2003).
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and crimes against humanity. They continue to lead in the worldwide
dissemination of lethal and inhumane weapons, refuse to dismantle
their stocks of weapons of mass destruction and profit from armed
conflicts. They are on record as using bribes and coercion on weaker
states in order to give the appearance of international legitimacy to the
resolutions of the Council.
" The composition of the Security Council, its rules of procedure and the
historical record of its permanent members justifies the presumption of
bad faith towards these members.
* When Security Council decisions are secured by bribes and threats or
are adopted in bad faith, their legitimacy may be questioned. The
possible ultra vires character of such decisions may in such cases be
invoked by states in support of their refusal to comply by such
decisions.
As there exists no mechanism to ensure that the Security Council acts
in good faith, and as it is presently composed may be presumed to act ultra
vires, whenever its most powerful members so desire, it follows that the
Council threatens rather than ensures international peace and security. If
this conclusion is accepted, the question arises what measures the nations
composing the United Nations could take in order to remove that threat to
the peace. A number of measures have been suggested, including
restraints imposed by the General Assembly through the exercise of
its powers in budgetary matters, non-compliance with Council
decisions by individual States, increase of the membership of the
Council and its restructuring as well as other possible forms of
judicial or quasi-judicial control through subsidiary organs, World
panels, ad hoc arbitrations and even municipal
Trade Organization
2
12

courts,

as well as a decision by the U.N. General Assembly not to elect nonpermanent members to the Security Council as was suggested by Erskine
Childers, the adoption of a Declaration by the U.N. General Assembly on
the Obligation by U.N. Organs to Respect Fundamental Human Rights in
All Circumstances and the adoption of effective measures against abusive
practices by and in the Council, such as securing votes by bribes and
coercion. Ultimately, any attempt to make international institutions, such
122. Dapo Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There
Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?, 46 INT'L
& COM. L.Q. 309, 310 (1997).
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as the Council, accountable to the world's peoples, to legal principles and
to human rights norms, will require determined, persistent, and worldwide
efforts by civil society.
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